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Market prices are frequently given little or no weight in resolving
valuation disputes in corporate law. Under Delaware corporate law,
for example, market prices can never be the sole determinant of value
in appraisal proceedings and, at most, are one factor to be considered.'
Similarly, corporate managers who negotiate corporate control trans-
actions at significant premiums under Delaware law face significant
potential liability for damages because courts dismiss the premium re-
2
ceived as irrelevant. Other jurisdictions, with rare exceptions, have
followed the same approach .
I argue here that courts should rely more heavily on market
prices when resolving valuation disputes than has occurred to date.
Part I of this Article discusses why market prices are superior to other
methods of valuation when market prices are available and addresses
the various justifications that have been advanced for limiting reliance
on market prices. Part I also briefly discusses other types of market
evidence.
Part II surveys some of the leading cases in corporate law to illus-
trate how adjudication of these cases would have been improved and
simplified had courts interpreted the relevant market evidence prop-
erly. Part II also extends the analysis outside corporate law to the
Winstar litigation-the damage claims filed by over one hundred say-
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1 See, for example, Cede & Co v Technicolor, Inc, 1990 Del Ch LEXIS 259, *101 (stating
that market value must be considered but that it is "axiomatic that market value ... is not the
sole element to be taken into consideration in the appraisal of stock"), quoting Application of
Delaware Racing Association, 42 Del Ch 406,213 A2d 203, 211 (1965). See also Chicago Corp v
Munds, 20 Del Ch 142, 172 A 452, 457 (1934) (holding that the market value of stock is a "perti-
nent consideration," but should not necessarily be accepted as "exclusive").
2 See, for example, Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985) (imposing liability on
corporate directors who negotiated a merger for a substantial premium over market price).
3 See, for example, In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co, 565 A2d 997,
1003 (Me 1989) (permitting other generally accepted valuation techniques besides the stock
market price); Sarrouf v New England Patriots Football Club, Inc, 397 Mass 542,492 NE2d 1122,
1127 (1986) (finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider
market value as a reliable indicator). The leading case relying on market prices to establish the
value of shares is Armstrong v Marathon Oil Co, 32 Ohio St 3d 397, 513 NE2d 776, 790 (1987)
(determining the "fair cash value" of shares by reference to market price, where a significant
market existed).
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ings and loans against the United States seeking tens of billions of dol-
lars in damages-following the decision by the Supreme Court in
United States v Winstar Corp, which held that the government
breached its contract with affected thrifts by enacting the Financial In-
stitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act. Finally, Part III
considers whether market prices should ever be used as a sword
rather than a shield; in other words, whether corporate managers
should be held liable when a decision they make results in a decline in
stock prices.
I. MARKET PRICES AND MARKET EVIDENCE
A. Market Prices versus Other Methods of Valuation
Various methods of valuing an asset exist One obvious method
is to value the asset at its market price if such a price is observable. An
alternative method is to value the asset based on how comparable as-
sets are valued. The third common valuation method is to discount to
present value of future cash flows generated by the asset.
Although all of the above techniques are accepted by the finan-
cial community for some purposes, market prices, when observable,
should be the dominant valuation approach in corporate transactions
and litigation. Market prices are superior to these other methods in
terms of conceptual clarity, simplicity, and objectivity. They also avoid
many of the pitfalls associated with other valuation methods. A more
detailed discussion of these reasons follows.
1. Conceptual clarity.
The fair market value of an asset is generally defined as the price
at which the asset would change hands in a transaction between a will-
ing buyer and a willing seller when neither is under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both are reasonably informed. This is exactly what a
market price represents (provided the conditions of no compulsion
and possession of reasonable information hold). The other valuation
methods, by contrast, are attempts to predict what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller. Yet, if the answer to this question is already
known because a market price is observable, no need exists to resort
to these indirect methods. For the same reason, no need exists to "av-
4 518 US 839 (1996).
5 For an excellent summary of different valuation techniques, see Bradford Cornell, Cor-
porate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making (McGraw-Hill 1993).
6 See, for example, Rev Rul 59-196, 1959-1 Cum Bul 56 (defining fair market value as "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, nei-
ther being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of rele-
vant facts").
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erage" the correct answer-the market price-with other indirect
methods for predicting the market price. Once the market price is
known, there is no need to do anything else.
2. Simplicity.
Ascertaining a market price requires minimal, frequently de
minimis, resources. The same cannot be said for other methods of
valuation. Comparables analysis requires multiple judgments concern-
ing what assets are comparable and in what ways. Two firms may be in
the same line of business but have different business strategies and
capital structures. Are the two firms comparable? This and countless
analogous questions typically make the choice of comparables, and
how to use the comparables to derive a value for the asset being val-
ued, a messy, time-consuming, and ultimately uncertain exercise.
Discounting future cash flows to present value presents similar
problems. Estimating cash flows, both positive and negative, into per-
petuity, and then choosing a discount rate to apply to these cash flows,
is often a massive undertaking fraught with difficulty. Simple reliance
on the market price avoids all of these problems.
3. Objectivity.
Buyers and sellers who set market prices act without bias. They
have no incentive to set values either too high or too low because they
are penalized in the marketplace for doing so. Paid experts in litiga-
tion who testify about values derived from analyzing comparables or
discounting future cash flows to present value have very different in-
centives. Such paid experts are not penalized in the marketplace for
excessive optimism or pessimism. On the contrary, their value as ex-
perts may be enhanced by their ability to exaggerate values in either
direction. Moreover, the large number of subjective judgments that
need to be made when performing a valuation analysis (choice of
comparables, estimating future cash flows, choice of a discount rate,
etc.) creates fertile opportunities for widely divergent conclusions.
When paid experts on opposite sides have an economic self-interest to
slant these subjective judgments in one direction or the other, the
probability that the experts will reach wildly different conclusions is
greater still. No wonder, then, that paid experts in litigation often
reach conclusions about value that differ by a multiple of ten or
more-to the great frustration of courts ill-equipped to pore over the
7 For a general discussion on the problems and flexibility associated with the other valua-
tion techniques in the context of fairness opinions issued by investment banks, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done
about It?, 1989 Duke L J 27.
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minefield of different assumptions and subjective judgments in resolv-
ing the dispute. Again, reliance on the market price avoids this prob-
lem of bias by eliminating, or at least greatly reducing, the role of paid
experts in litigation.
B. Rationales for Limiting Reliance on Market Prices
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of market prices for
valuing assets, a number of justifications have been advanced for not
relying on market prices. The main ones-that markets are inefficient,
that transaction volume may be too small to produce accurate prices,
that fair market value is distinguishable from fair value, and that in-
siders might be affecting the price through opportunistic behavior-
are all unsatisfactory. They need to be considered in turn.
1. Inefficient markets.
Reliance on market prices is most obvious if prices reflect all in-
formation (at least, all public information) about the value of the
firm's assets. But what if, for whatever the reason, prices (at least of
publicly traded securities) reflect mob psychology, fads, and other
similar factors, creating the possibility of speculative bubbles and
other departures from pricing based on the underlying value of as-
sets? Would it then make less sense to rely on market prices to resolve
valuation disputes?
The answer is no. At the most basic level, the market price of an
asset still satisfies the willing buyer/willing seller standard and thus re-
flects the fair market value of the asset being traded. Moreover, the
relevant question is not whether market prices are perfectly "effi-
cient" in the sense of reflecting the underlying values of assets, but
rather whether a better valuation method exists. No direct method ex-
ists for testing how closely prices reflect value, because the "value" of
an asset cannot be measured apart from an observed market price.
Moreover, values derived from an alternative valuation method are as
likely, indeed far more likely, to be attributable to defects in the alter-
native valuation model rather than problems with the market price. It
is important not to commit the Nirvana fallacy of comparing the im-
perfect to a nonexistent perfect, and then concluding that the perfect
is better. Whatever "inefficiencies" exist with market prices, the ineffi-
ciencies of subjective valuations performed by paid experts in litiga-
tion are far greater.
I do not mean to minimize the constant efforts of analysts and
other market professionals who constantly search for mispriced secu-
rities whose prices do not reflect their underlying values. On the con-
trary, it is precisely because of these market professionals, acting with
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their own wealth at stake, that valuation methods are already reflected
in market prices. No additional need exists for paid experts in litiga-
tion, who act without placing their own wealth at risk, to second-guess
market prices.
2. Isolated trades.
Sometimes trades are relatively isolated rather than continuous
as occurs with publicly traded securities. An inflexible rule that limits
the relevance of market prices where trading is infrequent, however,
would be a mistake. The informational content of such trades depends
entirely on the background facts and circumstances.
To be sure, situations exist where isolated trades have little in-
formational content. Traders may be completely uninformed; some of
the trades may be under duress; the timing of the trades may be too
removed in time from the valuation date in question. However, other
situations are also possible. Consider a series of trades between in-
formed insiders of a company, each under no compulsion to buy or
sell. The resulting transaction prices will arguably have as much in-
formational content as, or more informational content than, prices of
publicly traded securities because the traders will be more informed.
Information, in other words, is a substitute for liquidity. And for those
who believe that noise traders and other unsophisticated market par-
ticipants cause prices of publicly traded securities to deviate from
their "true" intrinsic value, less liquid but more informed markets may
produce more reliable market prices. No basis exists, therefore, for a
legal rule that automatically places less weight on transaction prices
solely because the market is less liquid.
3. Fair value versus fair market value.
Some courts have not criticized market prices directly, but rather
have drawn a distinction between "fair value" and "fair market value,"
where the former is defined as the value of the shareholder's propor-
tionate interest in a going concern rather than the market price of
shares.8 This raises the obvious question of why the market price of
shares held ("fair market value") should be different from the value
of the investor's proportionate interest in the firm.
8 See, for example, Friedman v Beway Realty Corp, 87 NY2d 161, 661 NE2d 972, 975-76
(1995) (claiming that "fair value is not necessarily tied to market value," but that, rather, "the fair
value of a dissenter's shares is to be determined on their worth in a going concern"); In re Valua-
tion of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co, 565 A2d 997, 1005 (Me 1989) (declining to "equate
the price at which a willing seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy ... stock with its fair
value").
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One possibility is the existence of inefficient markets where trad-
ing prices either over- or underestimate the value of the firm's assets.
As discussed above, this is an example of the Nirvana fallacy. Other
valuation methods performed by paid experts in litigation are plagued
by far worse defects than simple reliance on market prices.
A second possible justification for resort to the fair market value
standard is concern about minority discounts. Trading prices, the ar-
gument runs, reflect the value of marginal minority shares, which are
worth less than large blocs (assuming such large blocs exist) in the
same firm. Because of this disparity, the market value of, say, a 1 per-
cent minority position is worth less than 1 percent of the value of the
entire (all equity) firm. Under the fair value standard the minority
shareholder is entitled to receive the higher amount.
But why should the minority shareholder be entitled to more
than his shares are worth in the marketplace? No such entitlement can
be derived from the willing buyer/willing seller standard, which man-
dates the opposite result. Minority status is just as much a characteris-
tic of an investment as the firm's management or its business strategy,
and is equally factored into the price the investor paid in the first
place. No reason exists why some, but not all, of the economic compo-
nents of an investment should be considered when setting its value.
The shaky conceptual underpinnings of the fair value standard, cou-
pled with the practical problems involved with valuing an entire firm
when the market price of shares is observable, strongly suggest that
this alternative to reliance on market prices should be discarded alto-
gether in resolving valuation disputes.
4. Opportunistic behavior by insiders.
A final argument against reliance on market prices is that such
prices can be affected by insider opportunistic behavior. In evaluating
this argument, several situations need to be distinguished.
The most obvious situation where reliance on market prices is
problematic is where prices reflect the consideration being paid in the
valuation-triggering transaction. The shares of a subsidiary, for exam-
ple, will not trade for a higher price than the expected acquisition
price discounted by the probability of occurrence, unless some greater
amount will be available in an appraisal proceeding. But if the prevail-
ing market price is the standard for appraisal, then the appraisal pro-
ceeding becomes circular and meaningless. This problem can be
solved, however, by use of a statistical technique known as regression
analysis to predict what the market price would have been had the
valuation-triggering event not occurred. With this modification, mar-
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ket prices, or more accurately, reconstructed market prices, can still be
used to resolve valuation disputes.9
A second situation where insiders may want to go forward with a
valuation-triggering transaction is where they possess asymmetric in-
formation that current market prices are too low. Insiders may even
have an incentive to keep secret or delay the release of information to
depress market prices and therefore pay less in the valuation-
triggering transaction. This scenario, too, provides no basis for reject-
ing reliance on market prices to resolve valuation disputes.
Three points can be made briefly. First, it is not clear that this
problem is important empirically. No evidence exists that asymmetric
information is an important component of valuation-triggering trans-
actions. '° Second, if a problem exists, it is in no way unique to the tim-
ing of valuation-triggering transactions. Managers with asymmetric in-
formation can capitalize in a variety of ways, such as granting them-
selves stock options at the current (too low) market price as part of
their compensation packages." Third, and most important, this prob-
lem has nothing to do with reliance on market prices. Assume, for ex-
ample, that insiders delay announcing a new valuable technology so
that market prices do not reflect this information. Switching to other
valuation methods will not solve this problem. The same information
that is not reflected in stock prices will also not be reflected in earn-
ings or expected future cash flows. If something is not known, it will
not be reflected in any valuation methodology. The problem, if there is
a problem, is one for the law of fraud rather than a basis for rejecting
reliance on market prices.
A similar analysis applies to a third situation of insider opportun-
ism-where insiders deliberately take actions to reduce the value of
shares to be valued. They may do this by reducing the value of the en-
tire firm (although the damage insiders inflict on themselves, particu-
larly if they are significant insiders, is a significant safeguard against
this behavior) or by transferring wealth from the shareholders whose
stake is to be valued to themselves (such as a parent taking a corpo-
rate opportunity rather than sharing it with the subsidiary). In this
case, the insiders may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty or other
wrongdoing. But regardless of whether they are, the effect of the con-
9 I expand on this point in Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law,
1983 Am Bar Found Rsrch J 875,893-94 (providing an example of market-price reconstruction).
10 See, for example, Myron B. Slovin and Marie E. Sushka, The Economics of Parent-
Subsidiary Mergers: An Empirical Analysis, 49 J Fin Econ 255, 268-72 (1998) (concluding that
parent-subsidiary mergers increase efficiency and wealth, but that buyer returns are negative,
consistent with overbidding).
11 Provided, of course, that the asymmetric information is not material inside information
for purposes of the federal securities laws.
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duct in question on the value of the shares is real. And, once again, the
problem is the same regardless of the method of valuation used. Ac-
tions that reduce the value of shares will not only depress market
prices, but also earnings and expected future cash flows (indeed, this is
why market prices are depressed). Even this most extreme form of in-
sider misbehavior, therefore, provides no basis for rejecting reliance
on market prices.
C. A Note on Other Types of Market Evidence
Thus far I have been discussing market prices as the best indica-
tor of an asset's value. Sometimes, however, the relevant issue is not
the market price of the asset, but whether the market price has
changed in response to a particular event. Suppose, for example, that
the issue in a case is whether a shareholder vote approving a merger
was procured by material misrepresentations. Such a claim can be ana-
lyzed by performing an event study (a type of regression analysis) to
determine whether the alleged misrepresentations caused any statisti-
cally significant stock price movements when made or when a suppos-
edly corrective disclosure was made, controlling for other possible
causes of stock price movements (such as movements of the overall
market) and random fluctuations. This simple statistical technique,
used in thousands of academic studies and employed routinely in se-
curities fraud litigation brought under the federal securities laws, is
virtually unknown in resolving disputes under corporate law and other
contexts.'
2
Other times the decision by an informed market participant to
buy or sell will be relevant economic evidence in resolving a particular
dispute. Consider a claim that insiders intentionally depressed the
price of a subsidiary's shares in order to acquire the subsidiary at an
inadequate price for the benefit of the parent. If it turns out that the
parent's insiders are selling their stock during the time period of the
alleged scheme, this is economic evidence inconsistent with the claims.
Conversely, if a firm involved in a merger is accused of misrepresent-
ing the benefits of the proposed merger to induce its shareholders to
approve the transaction, a decision by the firm's insiders to buy its
stock during the time the alleged misrepresentations are being made
is again economic evidence inconsistent with the claim.
12 For a summary of the use of this type of statistical evidence in legal proceedings, see
David I. Tabak and Frederick C. Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies in the Court-
room, National Economics Research Associates Working Paper No 34 (Apr 1999), available
online at <http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/3841.pdf> (visited Feb 2,2002).
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II. SOME LEADING CORPORATE LAW CASES
Much of what has been said so far about the superiority of mar-
ket prices over other methods of valuation might seem obvious but for
the behavior of courts, which consistently employ a contrary analysis.
In doing so, courts have transformed cases that should have been easy
to resolve within days, if they were filed at all, into protracted, cum-
bersome, and messy litigation taking years, indeed sometimes more
than a decade, to resolve. Some of the leading cases are surveyed be-
low.
A. Weinberger v UOP, Inc
This case involved a parent-subsidiary merger between Signal
Corporation and UOP. In 1975, Signal initially acquired 50.5 percent
of UOP in a cash tender offer for $21 per share. UOP shares were
trading at a fraction under $14 prior to the announcement of the offer.
Three years later, in 1978, Signal decided to acquire the remaining
49.5 percent of UOP in a negotiated merger. Again, Signal offered $21
per share. The market price of UOP's shares was also basically un-
changed, as it was trading at $14.50 per share the day before the
merger was announced. Over 92 percent of the voting shareholders
approved the merger in a shareholder vote.
The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of UOP, attacked the trans-
action notwithstanding the 50-percent premium received. The case
should have been easy to resolve. Unless the approximately $14 UOP
price prior to the announcement of the merger was tainted in some
way (such as anticipation of a merger offer much lower than Signal's
$21 offer), UOP shareholders received far more than they gave up.
This should have been the end of the matter.
Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court attacked the transaction
and ignored the 50-percent premium received because: (1) UOP's di-
rectors decided to accept Signal's offer in only four business days; (2)
UOP's investment banker reached its opinion that the merger was fair
in a cursory manner; (3) the merger was not negotiated at arm's length
because certain of the UOP directors also represented Signal; and (4)
Signal failed to disclose a feasibility study, which concluded that the
transaction would have been a good deal for Signal at any price up to
$24 per share.
The first two criticisms of the transaction merit little discussion.
The beauty of reliance on market prices is that it avoids time-
consuming and expensive alternative methods of valuation. How
much time does it take to conclude that shareholders are better off re-
13 457 A2d 701 (Del 1983).
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ceiving $21 than holding shares worth $14? If anything, UOP appears
to have wasted $150,000, the fee it paid to its investment banker, to
conclude that the merger price was fair. Professional advice may have
been valuable for Signal (the buyer) to determine whether payment of
a 50-percent premium was prudent, but it was of no value to UOP
(the seller) precisely because of the information communicated by
market prices.
The third criticism-that the merger was not negotiated at arm's
length-is also unpersuasive. Delaware law does not prohibit inter-
ested director or conflict of interest transactions.N Rather, these trans-
actions are subject to greater scrutiny to ensure that they are "fair" -
that the terms reflect the market value of the asset being traded. Here,
however, the market value of the shares being purchased was known
and already established by the market. The 50-percent premium paid
over this price eliminates any possibility that the shares were being
acquired for less than their market value. And because Signal already
owned a majority of UOP's shares, no possibility existed of a compet-
ing bid for control. Not surprisingly, there was no suggestion in the
case that Signal's actions prevented a third party from bidding for a
minority stake in UOP.
The final criticism-that Signal failed to disclose the feasibility
study concluding that it was worthwhile to acquire the UOP shares at
any price up to $24-borders on the frivolous. Since this study shed no
light on the pre-transaction value of UOP but rather apparently re-
flected the benefits to Signal of 100 percent ownership, a strong argu-
ment could be made that it was immaterial as a matter of law. The $14
value of the UOP shares absent the transaction was unchanged, and
UOP's shareholders still benefited from receiving the 50-percent pre-
mium. More fundamentally, no principle of fiduciary duty requires
that all of the gains created by a parent-subsidiary merger flow to the
minority shareholders of the subsidiary. It is quite enough (perhaps
too much) that the UOP minority shareholders appear to have re-
ceived most of the gains from the transaction, as is generally true in
parent-subsidiary mergers.'5 Requiring minority shareholders to re-
14 8 Del Code Ann § 144(a) (1991):
No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers,
or between a corporation and any other corporation ... in which 1 or more of its directors
or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable,
[provided that (1) the "relationship or interest" is known or disclosed to and approved in
good faith by the shareholders or the board of directors, or (2) the "contract or transaction
is fair" to the corporation].
15 See Slovin and Sushka, 49 J Fin Econ at 256-57 (cited in note 10) (concluding that "par-
ent-subsidiary mergers enhance the wealth of minority shareholders, and that their share of the
overall gains in value exceeds their proportional ownership of the subsidiary"). In Weinberger it-
self, the parent apparently concluded, taking the feasibility study at face value, that the transac-
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ceive all of the gains from the transaction would only eliminate the in-
centive to go forward in the first place, leaving the minority share-
holders stuck with the lower pre-transaction price. Fiduciary duties
should not be interpreted in such an irrational manner.
As bad as the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis of the transac-
tion at issue in Weinberger is, its discussion of principles of valuation
to guide future cases is even worse. Prior to Weinberger, valuation un-
der Delaware law was governed by the Delaware block method, under
which an appraiser calculated a weighted average of market, earnings,
and asset values. The Weinberger court rejected this approach, not be-
cause calculation of earnings and asset values was unnecessary if mar-
ket prices were known, but rather for the opposite reason that the
block method was too restrictive and did not consider enough factors.
For the future, the court announced, "all relevant factors" must be
considered when valuing shares. 7 It is difficult to imagine a standard
that creates more uncertainty or a greater incentive for wasteful litiga-
tion mired in a morass of expensive and pointless valuation tech-
niques which are vastly inferior to simple reliance on market prices.
B. Smith v Van Gorkom"'
In 1980, Trans Union Corporation was merged into a wholly
owned subsidiary of Marmon Group, Inc., a corporation controlled by
the Pritzker family. The merger, which was negotiated at arm's length,
enabled Trans Union to solve the problem of its unused investment
tax credits, which its directors had unsuccessfully attempted to do for
years. Trans Union's shareholders received $55 in cash for their shares,
which were previously trading in the mid-$30s, a premium of ap-
proximately 50 percent, just as in Weinberger. Also as in Weinberger,
the shareholders overwhelmingly approved the merger.
The Delaware Supreme Court again upheld a challenge to the
merger, holding that Trans Union's directors breached their duty of
care by failing to become adequately informed about the merger and
its terms. Specifically, the court concluded that the directors "were un-
informed as to the intrinsic value of the Company."'" The directors' re-
liance on the 50-percent premium over market price as a justification
for approving the merger was emphatically rejected: "Using market
tion created $9.50 of potential benefit ($24 minus the preexisting market price of $14.50). The
minority received $6.50 of this assumed benefit ($21 minus $14.50) or slightly more than two-
thirds of the total ($6.50 of $9.50).
16 For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R.
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 117-19 (Harvard 1991).
17 Weinberger, 457 A2d at 712-13.
18 488 A2d 858 (Del 1985).
19 Id at 874.
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price as a basis for concluding that the premium adequately reflected
the true value of the Company was a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious,
premise." This was because, according to the court, the directors
"knew" that Trans Union's stock price was "undervalued" as a result
of the company's inability to use its investment tax credits. Rather
than relying on the size of the premium over the "admittedly de-
pressed stock market price," the directors should have hired outside
experts to opine on the adequacy of the premium after performing
"other relevant valuation techniques. ' 2' Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case for a potential award of damages "to the extent that
the fair value of Trans Union exceed[ed] $55 per share.""
The court should have dismissed the action summarily. Contrary
to the court's analysis, the directors acted properly in approving the
merger based on the premium paid over the preexisting market price.
Their belief that Trans Union's stock price did not reflect its true value
was simply a recognition of the investment tax credit problem. The
stock price was "depressed" only in the sense that it would have been
higher had the investment tax credit problem not existed. This is
equivalent in every respect to saying that the stock price of every
company is "depressed" because each has some problem that causes
the price to be lower than if the problem did not exist.
However, even assuming that there was something unique about
the investment tax problem causing Trans Union's stock price to be
"depressed," so what? The market price, depressed or not, still repre-
sented what Trans Union shareholders could realize for their shares.
And if investors are so stupid as to set an artificially low price for
Trans Union's shares, what assurance is there that this same stupidity
will not result in an even lower price in the future? The directors were
entirely justified in concluding that the merger was beneficial since it
increased shareholders' wealth by 50 percent; the fact that the market
price was depressed is irrelevant to this consideration. The only excep-
tion would be if directors had the ability to predict future stock price
movements with certainty, a most unlikely possibility.
The court's mandated alternative to reliance on market price-
that the directors should have informed themselves about Trans Un-
ion's "intrinsic value"-is vacuous. What does this mean? The most
charitable interpretation is that the court chastised the directors for
failing to consider the value of the company sold as a whole rather
than focusing on the trading price of a single share. But, as discussed
above, this distinction is specious and, in any event, the market price
20 Id at 875-76.
21 Id at 891.
22 Id at 893.
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of shares also reflects the prospect that the company as a whole will
be sold at a given price. The 50-percent premium over market price, in
other words, already takes into account the consensus judgment of
market participants as to the present value of all future outcomes, in-
cluding the sale of the entire firm.2 Under the court's analysis, how-
ever, the collective opinion of these market participants-who put
their own money on the line in deciding whether to buy or sell and at
what price, as well as whether to approve the merger-is to be dis-
carded in favor of the opinions of paid experts who risk nothing and
necessarily rely on uncertain and biased valuation techniques.
C. Cede v Technicolor, Inc"
In late October 1982, Technicolor and MAF Corporation reached
an agreement whereby MAF would acquire Technicolor in a two-step
transaction: a cash tender offer by MAF at $23 for all of Technicolor's
outstanding shares followed by a second-step merger with the remain-
ing shares also converted into $23 in cash. Technicolor's shareholders
experienced a windfall from the transaction. The $23 price repre-
sented a premium of more than 100 percent over Technicolor's pre-
acquisition price. (Technicolor's stock price, which had been falling
because of poor company performance, reached a new low of $8.37 in
September 1982.) Not surprisingly, Technicolor shareholders, including
senior members of its management team who were knowledgeable
about the company's operations and prospects, as well as MAF's
planned changes of business strategy described in the tender offer
documents, enthusiastically embraced MAF's bid. Over 82 percent of
Technicolor's shares were tendered in the first-step tender offer. The
remaining shares were acquired in the second-step merger completed
in January 1983.
Cinerama, a Technicolor shareholder, dissented from the merger
and filed a series of claims attacking the $23 price paid as inadequate
and seeking other relief against Technicolor's directors for various al-
leged breaches of fiduciary duty. To support its claims, Cinerama pre-
sented the analysis of a paid expert who concluded, based on his
valuation, that Technicolor's shares were really worth over $60 per
share. Technicolor countered with experts of its own who concluded,
using a variety of valuation techniques, including reliance on the pre-
23 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus
Law 1437 (1985) (discussing why the Trans Union directors acted proierfy in accepting the
Pritzker bid, rather than shopping for a higher price and taking the risk of winding up with noth-
ing).
24 The following facts are taken from the first reported Cede decision on valuation, Cede &
Co v Technicolor, Inc, 1990 Del Ch LEXIS 259, *1-22.
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mium over the pre-acquisition market price, that the offer was fair to
Technicolor's shareholders.
As in Weinberger and Van Gorkom, the case should have been
resolved quickly and summarily. Delaware law requires that shares
must be valued as of the merger date, in this case January 24, 1983,
"exclusive" of any value created by the transaction dissented from.
This value could be no greater than $23, the price paid. This is the
price at which willing buyers and sellers transacted; it also represents
more than a 100-percent premium over Technicolor's pre-acquisition
price. Technicolor's most knowledgeable insiders, those in the best po-
sition to know Technicolor's "true value," were willing to sell at the
$23 price. Under these circumstances, the conclusion of Technicolor's
expert-that the shares were really worth more than $60 per share-
was absurd on its face and should have been discarded in its entirety.
There should have been no issues left to litigate.
There is, however, one exception. The value of the Technicolor
shares "exclusive" of any value created by the merger was certainly
less than $23. MAF presumably never would have paid $23 if one as-
sumes, as is required by the Delaware statute, that the gains from the
merger be ignored. To assume otherwise is to assume that the second-
step merger added no value. This would be extremely dubious since
owning 100 percent of Technicolor stock at a minimum enabled MAF
to avoid the conflicts and related problems that exist when there is a
subsidiary with minority shareholders. More fundamentally, if the
Delaware statute, as I have argued elsewhere, is interpreted to exclude
gains not just from the second-step merger itself, but also resulting
from the first-step tender offer as well, because the transaction is best
viewed as a unitary one occurring in two steps, the best estimate of the
value of Technicolor's shares is the pre-tender offer price adjusted for
intervening movements in the overall market and industry.n This
would undoubtedly yield a value for the Technicolor shares for pur-
poses of the Delaware appraisal statute of far less than $23. But if the
court were not persuaded by these arguments, it could simply have
awarded Cinerama $23, the same price received by Technicolor's other
shareholders. The case should have been over in days (and had the
rules been known in advance, the case would never have been filed).
Instead, what followed has to be viewed as one of the most em-
barrassing episodes in corporate law history. The market evidence,
which should have resolved the case, has been completely ignored.
Numerous lengthy and turgid opinions have been issued by the Dela-
25 8 Del Code Ann § 262(h) (1991) (instructing courts to appraise shares by "determining
their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expecta-
tion of the merger or consolidation").
26 See Fischel, 1983 Am Bar Rsrch J at 896-98 (cited in note 9).
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ware courts, discussing in excruciating detail the various valuations
performed by the competing experts in the case and other irrelevant
issues. Nothing has been resolved. In 1999, after more than fifteen
years of continuous and pointless litigation, the Chancery Court, try-
ing to interpret the latest in a string of incomprehensible opinions on
the case issued by the Delaware Supreme Court, gave up and ap-
pointed a "neutral expert witness" to value the Technicolor shares.2 To
the best of my knowledge, the embarrassment continues: The litiga-
tion, which has now gone on for almost two decades, has still not con-
cluded.
D. The Irvine Co v Smith
The cases discussed thus far have all involved public companies
with exchange-listed securities. The Irvine case illustrates how market
evidence can be used to resolve valuation disputes involving privately
held companies.
The Irvine Company is a real estate company with substantial
holdings in Orange County, California. In early 1983, just before the
controversy in question, the Irvine Company had approximately ten
shareholders, with Donald Bren holding the largest stake at 35 per-
cent. The other shareholders, like Bren, were highly sophisticated and
experienced.2
In February 1983, Bren offered to purchase all of the outstanding
shares of the Irvine Company for $200,000 per share. A new corpora-
tion, Newco, was created and financed to facilitate the purchases. The
overwhelming majority of Irvine's shareholders decided to sell their
shares to Bren via Newco.
In November 1983, Newco and the Irvine Company merged. As a
result of the way the merger was structured, Bren in effect sold back
the shares he had purchased in the February transaction at the same
price he paid for them. The other existing shareholders who did not
sell in February were offered the choice of receiving $208,400 in cash
for each of their shares (the amount paid in February plus interest) or
the ability to continue as investors in the new company with the same
proportionate stake that they held before. Thus, the shareholders had
a simple choice to make: they could take the money if they believed
their shares were worth less than $208,400 per share, or they could
remain as investors with the same proportionate stake if they believed
their share of the new company was worth more. Two shareholders,
27 Cede, 1999 Del Ch LEXIS 15 at *2.
28 No 83-27001-CZ, slip op (Mich Cir Ct, Oakland County June 25,1990).
29 Id at 31 (noting that shareholders were "some of the most sophisticated and successful
businessmen in America and served on the board of directors").
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however, rejected both alternatives and chose instead to invoke their
appraisal rights under the governing Michigan law, claiming that their
shares were "really worth" $600,000 per share.
Again, the case should have been a no-brainer. Extremely knowl-
edgeable buyers and sellers set the value of Irvine shares at $200,000
per share. Bren was both a buyer and a seller at this price. The share-
holders who did not sell in February were given a second choice in
November of either receiving the same price the selling shareholders
accepted in February and Bren himself accepted in November, or con-
tinuing as investors with the same stake as before. A fairer transaction
is hard to imagine. As in Cede, the only question worth litigating was
whether the dissenters should have received less than $208,400 per
share to avoid awarding them some of the gains created by the trans-
action from which they were dissenting.
But nothing like this occurred. Instead, the court rejected the
market evidence in its entirety as unreliable and conducted a mara-
thon trial lasting more than a year, dominated by conflicting testimony
from multiple valuation experts offered by both sides. Ultimately, the
court concluded that the dissenters were entitled to $271,000 per share
plus interest, or approximately 30 percent more than all other selling
shareholders received.
The decision, as well as the misuse of the legal system that pro-
duced it, is an outrage. Is it really plausible that the court, no matter
the length of the trial or the number of experts who testified, knew
more about the value of Irvine shares than the highly sophisticated
shareholders themselves, including Bren, who was both a buyer and a
seller at the same price? And is it conceivable that a more-than-a-
year-long trial can be justified when market evidence is so powerful
and the dissenters by their own actions revealed that they did not be-
lieve their own claim that the shares were worth more than $208,400
per share (if they really believed this, they would have continued as
investors)? The Irvine case, like the cases discussed above, is a poster
child illustrating why corporate law would be vastly improved if courts
were more receptive to market evidence when resolving valuation
disputes.
E. Other Applications: Glendale Federal Bank, FSB v United States'
Market evidence is underutilized in contexts other than resolving
valuation disputes in corporate law. The Glendale case dramatically il-
lustrates how market evidence can improve and simplify decisionmak-
ing in other contexts.
30 43 Fed C1390 (1999).
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Savings and loan institutions are subject to minimum capitaliza-
tion requirements. The lower the minimum capital requirement, the
more thrifts can borrow (take-in deposits) for a given dollar of equity.
If the capital requirement is 3 percent, for example, for every dollar of
equity thrifts can borrow $33 (100/3); if the requirement is 2 percent,
thrifts can borrow $50 (100/2) and so on. If a thrift cannot meet the
minimum capital requirement, regulators can close it down.
In the early 1980s, the thrift industry as a whole was insolvent on
a market value basis. In response, Congress and thrift regulators
adopted a policy of forbearance, which enabled insolvent thrifts to
remain open. Thrifts were allowed, for example, with government ap-
proval to utilize a variety of gimmicks which enabled insolvent thrifts
to meet existing capital requirements with phony accounting entries
such as "supervisory goodwill" and thereby remain open.
In 1989, Congress reversed course and enacted a new law, the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA"),' which eliminated thrifts' ability to count supervisory
goodwill and other tangible assets as capital.2 The law was immedi-
ately challenged, and in United States v Winstar,' the Supreme Court
held that Congress had breached contracts with multiple thrifts by
changing the rules regulating what counts as capital.
Over one hundred thrifts filed suits against the government
claiming tens of billions of dollars in damages. Glendale, which itself
claimed two billion dollars in damages under various theories, was the
first of these cases to go to trial in Winstar's aftermath.
But Glendale, a publicly traded company, faced an immediate and
obvious problem in pursuing its damage claim-an event study of its
stock price on relevant dates demonstrated that FIRREA did not
cause Glendale's value to fall. On the contrary, Glendale's stock value
increased by over $100 million as a result of FIRREA's enactment.m
This result, which is consistent with every published study on the ef-
fect of FIRREA on the thrift industry,5 including a study focusing on
31 Pub L No 101-73,103 Stat 183 (1989), codified at various sections of title 12 (2000).
32 12 USC § 1464(t) (1994 & Supp 2000).
33 518 US at 870 (stating that the federal government breached its contracts with the thrifts
as a result of "the new regulatory capital requirements imposed by FIRREA").
34 Event study for Glendale Federal Bank, FSB (on file with author).
35 See, for example, Leonard Bierman, Donald R. Fraser, and Asghar Zardkoohi, On the
Wealth Effects of the Supervisory Goodwill Controversy, 22 J Fm Rsrch 69, 70 (1999) (finding
that the Supreme Court's decision in Winstar had "substantial, positive effects on the market
value" of the involved thrifts, while there were "no negative market value effects of the
FIRREA-mandated change in accounting regulations"); Jeff Madura, Alan L. Tlicker, and Emilio
R. Zarruk, Market Reaction to the Thrift Bailout, 17 J Bank & Fm 591,592 (1993) (observing that
"commercial banks experienced a slight positive share price response [to FIRREA] while thrifts
experienced a strong positive share price response"); Sridhar Sundaram, Nanda Rangan, and
Wallace N. Davidson III, The Market Valuation Effects of FIRREA, 16 J Bank & Fm 1097, 1099
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a subset of the industry that had sued the government after Winstar al-
leging injury from FIRREA,3' fundamentally contradicted Glendale's
damage claim. How could Glendale have suffered $2 billion in dam-
ages from a law that caused its value to increase by more than $100
million?
The court was not troubled by this glaring anomaly, however, be-
cause it concluded that event studies are "speculative and unreli-
able."'37 Why did the court reach such a sweeping conclusion, notwith-
standing the thousands of academic studies that have utilized event
study methodology to analyze the effects of countless events, includ-
ing FIRREA, on stock prices?
The court explained its rationale in a footnote to its opinion.3
Shortly after Glendale concluded its case, but before the government
presented its defense, the court held a status conference with the par-
ties to communicate its view of the plaintiff's case. At this status con-
ference, the judge stated that Glendale's case was the "strongest" he
had ever seen in all his years as a judge. Immediately following the
judge's comments, which were reported in The Wall Street Journal and
elsewhere,39 the value of Glendale's trading certificates (a special secu-
rity whose value was tied to the outcome of the litigation) and the se-
curities of other thrifts with similar breach of contract damage claims
against the government increased significantly. The court interpreted
this stock price reaction as demonstrating the market's irrationality
because, according to the court, the status conference, properly under-
stood, communicated "very little" information to market participants.'
The court's discussion is revealing. Of course the judge's com-
ments were important. Glendale was seeking billions of dollars in
damages in the first case after Winstar. The case was being tried by the
highly influential and respected Chief Judge and was widely seen as
likely to have a major effect on the outcome of all future Winstar-
related cases. Under these circumstances, investors' positive reaction
to the court's comments was entirely predictable and understandable.
Indeed, it would have made more sense for the court to interpret the
market participants' reaction to its comments as validating the use of
event studies rather than as impeaching their validity.
(1992) (indicating that "FIRREA was perceived positively by the stock market, and that the
shareholders of both banks and [thrifts] generally benefited from its passage").
36 See Bierman, Fraser, and Zardkoohi, 22 J Fin Rsrch 69 (cited in note 35).
37 Glendale, 43 Fed Cl at 402 n 5.
38 Id.
39 Alan Yonan, Jr., Glendale Federal's Case against U.S. Called 'Exceedingly Strong' by
Judge, Wall St J B16 (Sept 5, 1997); U.S. Judge Lauds Bank in Lawsuit, NY Times D4 (Sept 5,
1997); Judge-Glendale Fedl-4: Thrift Stks Move on Judge's Remarks, Dow Jones News 15:12
(Sept 4,1997).
40 Glendale, 43 Fed Cl at 402 n 5.
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Having rejected reliance on market evidence, the court con-
ducted the familiar year-long trial, dominated as usual by multiple ex-
perts, and then took another year to issue an opinion. After all that,
the court concluded that Glendale was entitled to damages of $909
million, a judgment which was then reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals" The case is currently back on remand with no end in sight.
Once again, it is hard to escape the conclusion that market evidence,
whatever its limitations, provides a more accurate, faster, and less
costly method for resolving many disputes than has been recognized
to date.
III. USING MARKET EVIDENCE AS A SWORD TO ATTACK
BUSINESS DECISIONS
All of the examples discussed in the preceding section involved
situations where, I have argued, an increase in stock price or the re-
ceipt of a premium over market price should have defeated a claim
for liability and damages. What about the converse? Consider a situa-
tion where a company takes an action (for example, it announces a
change in business strategy or a merger, or successfully resists a take-
over attempt) and its stock price plummets as a result. Does the de-
cline in stock price establish or even suggest that the corporate man-
agers who made the decision should be liable in damages?
I believe the answer is no. Numerous reasons exist why a decline
in stock price should be irrelevant for establishing liability when busi-
ness decisions are challenged.
1. Difficulty of distinguishing performance from breach.
Courts are ill equipped to distinguish between bad decisions and
good decisions that turn out poorly. This is one of the rationales un-
derlying the business judgment rule. Penalizing managers when stock
prices fall following a corporate decision will cause them to be sued in
many situations even though they have done everything right. Nothing
is gained from a senseless application of liability rules.
2. Managers' risk aversion.
A related point is that managers are risk averse. If they face pun-
ishment when they make good decisions ex ante that turn out poorly
ex post, they will have an incentive to avoid risky but positive net pre-
sent value projects. Investors as a class will be worse off as a result.
41 Glendale Federal Bank; FSB v United States, 239 F3d 1374,1384 (Fed Cir 2001) (vacating
the trial court's award of damages and remanding for a determination of "total reliance dam-
ages").
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3. Asymmetric information.
Corporate managers are hired because they have expertise. They
may even have access to information that is not yet publicly known.
They may turn out to be right, in other words, even if the market be-
lieves them to be wrong. Legal rules should not discourage corporate
managers from acting on their special expertise and access to that in-
formation.
4. Unclear causation.
Sometimes stock prices will decline when a decision is announced
because of what the decision signals about the state of the company
rather than because of the decision itself. A stock price decline follow-
ing a company announcement of a merger may, for example, commu-
nicate new information about the company's inability to survive on its
own. The merger announcement in this example reveals information
about the company that was eventually going to become known in any
event. Similarly, the stock price decline was also going to occur even
had no merger announcement been made and, in fact, it might have
been larger had the company done nothing. In this situation, the
merger announcement makes things better, even if the stock price
falls at the time, and it would thus be a mistake to penalize the corpo-
rate managers responsible for the decision.
I am not suggesting that corporate managers should never be
held liable for their decisions, only that such liability should not be
based on whether the stock price falls or not. Take perhaps the hardest
case-when a target's management successfully resists a takeover at a
significant premium and the stock price plummets. Frank Easterbrook
and I have argued elsewhere that takeover defenses are socially harm-
ful and should be prohibited.2 If this proposed rule were adopted (and
thus far it has not been), takeover defenses would be banned regard-
less of their effect on stock prices. But if defenses are permitted in
some circumstances, they should not be prohibited when lower stock
prices are the result. Such a rule would, for example, penalize manag-
ers for unsuccessfully attempting to trigger an auction or negotiating
for a higher price. If the goal is otherwise lawful, and no other grounds
exist, procedural or otherwise, for attacking what managers did, the
lower stock price should be irrelevant.
42 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv L Rev 1161,1164 (1981).
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CONCLUSION
Courts should give more, often conclusive, weight to market evi-
dence when resolving valuation disputes in corporate law. This seems
so obvious, at least to me, that it is worth speculating why so many
courts have been hostile to market evidence. One possibility is igno-
rance, although the points are so simple that this is hard to believe. A
second possibility is that lawyers and experts who benefit from long,
complex, and indeterminate proceedings have influenced the devel-
opment of legal rules in this area. Why judges have been so receptive
to anti-market arguments, however, is less clear. Hopefully, this phe-
nomenon will soon end. Greater reliance on market evidence will en-
able courts to resolve valuation controversies far more accurately at a
fraction of the cost incurred under current law.

